With tariffs and non-tariff barriers back in vogue worldwide, ensuring that green goods and services can be traded widely will require the creation of special arrangements. Using existing regional trade agreements as a basis for such arrangements could go a long way toward accelerating the adoption of low-carbon technologies.

BEIJING – US President Donald Trump’s threats to raise tariffs on imports from Canada, China, and Mexico – which he now says may happen on February 1 – have the world bracing for major trade disruptions. While protectionism has come back into vogue, and countries like the United States are cultivating critical sectors at home to bolster their economic security, the reversal of free trade will accelerate under Trump, with far-reaching consequences – not least for the fight against climate change.

There is a straightforward path to ending our dependence on fossil fuels: nurture green industries – which would not only mitigate climate change, but also boost economic growth and job creation – and ensure that their output can be traded as widely as possible. Open trade would strengthen these industries, reduce the costs of green goods and services in most countries, and facilitate the adoption of low-carbon practices and technologies.

At a time of rising protectionism, pursuing this path requires the establishment of a special green free-trade arrangement, involving sharp reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers on goods and services that deliver environmental and climate benefits. Since one or two economies could scupper a truly global framework, multiple smaller arrangements could be created by “coalitions of the willing.”

Using existing regional trade agreements as a basis for green trade could hasten this process considerably. Consider the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – the world’s largest trade bloc by both population and GDP – comprising Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the ten ASEAN countries. Operating within the RCEP’s framework may enable quicker agreement and implementation of a green free-trade arrangement involving countries that collectively account for 30% of global economic activity.

The first step toward realizing this vision would be to demonstrate clearly the economic benefits of a green trade agreement to all members of arrangements like the RCEP. A preliminary study, based on a “computable general equilibrium” model and conducted by the Institute of Finance and Sustainability (which I chair) and research partners, does just that. Our study, which we will present at a conference in Hong Kong in March, found that a green free-trade arrangement could boost members’ economies (in terms of GDP, exports, jobs, and fiscal revenue), bolster their green industries, and bring about faster decarbonization.

Next, in order to help mitigate climate change and address environmental degradation, countries must identify the goods and services that should be covered by the green free-trade arrangement. Our study suggests that this list could include a few dozen categories and a few hundred products and services, including renewable energy, electric vehicles (EVs) and their components, waste management, sustainable agriculture, nature-based solutions, and environmental professional services.

A third priority is to attract green foreign investment and technology transfers, which requires a more stable policy environment, protections for investors, and secure intellectual property rights in the regional trade blocs. A green trade arrangement that ensures these conditions would help lower-income countries, in particular, to develop their green industries and create green jobs. In the RCEP, for example, Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean firms producing, say, EVs or solar panels might license their technologies to producers in the ASEAN countries and invest in building up the region’s green supply chains.

Such arrangements must also address non-tariff barriers, which can impede trade and investment even within low-tariff or tariff-free zones. A successful green trade arrangement must start with careful analysis of all non-tariff barriers, including those arising from import and export quotas, quality-control and customs-clearance processes, product-traceability requirements, trade-finance and export-credit insurance, and the settlement of cross-border payments. Targeted measures to lower these barriers – for example, harmonizing quality and traceability standards across jurisdictions and reducing the cost of trade finance using green finance instruments – should then be implemented.

Leadership and open dialogue are essential. In the case of the RCEP, larger economies like Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea should take the lead in cultivating consensus, with discussions highlighting the arrangement’s wide-ranging benefits for all. This approach would support a “just transition” to a climate-neutral economy, by accelerating decarbonization in participating countries, advancing growth and job creation in green industries, and fostering the mutual trust that is essential to broader cooperation on climate and trade issues.

The case for green trade arrangements is even stronger when one compares them to the approach being embraced by advanced economies. While the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) favored by the European Union, the United Kingdom, and potentially the US can reduce carbon “leakage” from imports produced in countries with more lenient emissions rules, it harms incomes and employment in the developing economies exporting carbon-intensive goods. And it does nothing to foster cooperation; on the contrary, such unilateral measures could lead to retaliation and yet more protectionism.

As incentives go, CBAM amounts to a “stick,” which punishes developing countries for not sacrificing domestic growth and development in order to reduce emissions. A green free-trade arrangement, by contrast, amounts to a “carrot”: by aligning climate goals with development objectives, it rewards participating economies for making progress in the green transition. It is a win-win solution – just the type a just green transition demands.

北京消息——美国总统特朗普威胁要对从加拿大、中国和墨西哥进口的商品加征关税，且声称这些措施可能于2月1日出台，迫使全世界都要面对重大贸易乱局。随着保护主义再度盛行，美国等国试图正在国内扶持关键产业以强化自身经济安全，但自由贸易保护主义将在特朗普治下加速并产生诸多深远影响——尤其是将冲击全球应对气候变化的努力。

要终结对化石燃料的依赖，最重要的路径是发展绿色产业。发展绿色产业不仅能减缓气候变化，还能促进经济增长和创造就业。为了发展绿色产业，需要确保绿色产品能够尽可能广泛地开展自由贸易。开放贸易将巩固绿色产业，降低大多数国家绿色产品和服务的成本，促进低碳实践和技术的广泛应用。

在这个保护主义盛行的时代，要走这条路就必须建立一种特殊的绿色自由贸易机制，其中包括大幅降低具有环境和气候效益的“绿色”产品与服务的关税及非关税壁垒。鉴于个别大国对全球化自由贸易框架的否定，在全球范围内构建绿色贸易机制已经不太可能，但我们可以通过组织“志同道合”的国家来创建多个区域性的绿色自由贸易机制。

 以现有的区域贸易协定为基础开展绿色贸易，能够大大加快这一进程。以区域全面经济伙伴关系协定（Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership，以下均简称RCEP）为例，这个由澳大利亚、中国、日本、新西兰、韩国和东盟十国组建的贸易协定在人口总量和GDP总额方面都居世界第一。在RCEP框架内运作，或许能使占全球经济活动总量 30% 的这些国家，更快就绿色自由贸易机制达成共识并付诸实施。

实现这一愿景的第一步，是向RCEP所有成员国清晰明确地展示绿色贸易协定能够给各成员国带来的经济效益。针对这个议题，北京绿色金融与可持续发展研究院（由笔者担任院长）的研究团队和合作伙伴一起基于 “可计算一般均衡”（CGE） 模型，开展了一项初步研究，并于若干会议上展示。研究发现，绿色自由贸易机制能够使所有RCEP成员国受益，既推动成员国的经济发展（提升其国内生产总值、出口、就业和财政收入），也支持其绿色产业，并加快去碳化进程。

其次，为了帮助减缓气候变化和解决环境退化问题，各国必须就自由贸易机制应当涵盖的“绿色”产品和服务达成一致。我们的研究表明，这份清单可能包含几十种类别、数百种产品和服务，其中包括可再生能源、电动汽车及其零部件、废弃物管理、可持续农产品、基于自然的解决方案以及环境专业服务等，以及一系列低碳产品与服务。

第三，要在绿色贸易机制内增加鼓励外国绿色投资和技术转让的内容。这需要在区域贸易集团内营造更加稳定的政策环境、保护投资者权益并保障知识产权。具备这些条件的绿色贸易机制，将更有助于低收入国家发展其绿色产业并创造绿色就业机会。比如在RCEP框架下，生产电动汽车或太阳能电池板等产品的中日韩国企业就可以向东盟国家生产商发放技术许可并投资建设该地区的绿色供应链。

第四，绿色自由贸易机制还必须要重点解决各类非关税壁垒问题。因为即使在低关税或免税区内，这类壁垒也会阻碍贸易和投资。创建一项成功的绿色贸易机制，必须首先认真分析所有非关税壁垒，包括进出口配额、质量控制和海关清关程序、产品可追溯性要求、贸易融资和出口信贷保险以及跨境支付结算，然后再采取针对性措施降低这些壁垒，比如统一各司法管制区的质量和可追溯性标准，利用绿色金融工具降低贸易融资成本。

第五，领导力和平等协商至关重要。就区域全面经济伙伴关系协定而言，澳大利亚、中国、印尼、日本和韩国等较大经济体可率先达成共识，并在讨论中强调该机制对各方的广泛益处。这种做法将支持向气候中性经济的“公正转型”，加快参与国的去碳化进程，推动绿色产业的增长和创造就业岗位，并促进对在气候和贸易问题上开展更广泛合作至关重要的互信。

如果将绿色贸易机制与发达经济体正在采用的做法进行比较，那么其理由就更加充分了。欧盟、英国以及美国（有可能）青睐的碳边境调整机制虽然能够减少来自排放规则更宽松国家进口产品的碳“泄漏”，但却损害了那些出口碳密集型产品的发展中经济体的收入和就业。而且这种单边措施无助于推动合作，反而可能引发报复和更多的保护主义行为。

就推动气候行动的激励措施而言，碳边境调整机制相当于一根“大棒”，用以惩罚那些碳强度较高的发展中国家，这种手段属于“零和”游戏。相比之下绿色自由贸易机制则类似“胡萝卜”——通过将气候目标与发展目标相结合，对在绿色转型中取得进展的经济体予以奖励。后者是一种双赢的解决方案——也恰是公正的绿色转型所需要的。

本文载于北大国发院《气候政策与绿色金融》季报第十一期。

本文版权为作者、北大国发院以及宏观与绿色金融实验室所有。侵权必究。